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1. Introduction
No discussion on the oil industry is complete without reference to its
seven leading firms, which are collectively known as the "seven
sisters" or "majors". The main objective of this paper is to analyse
the major characteristics of these firms and the implications of those
characteristics for both the oil-producing and the oil-consuming
countries in an historical perspective as well as in the light of the
current oil crisis.
Five of these firms are domiciles of the USA - Standard Oil of New
Jersey (or Exxon), Socony Mobil Oil, Standard Oil of California,
Gulf Oil, and Texas Oil. Of the other two, one is British (British
Petroleum) and the other is jointly owned by British and Dutch
interests (Royal Dutch/Shell). A Frçnch company, called CFP, is
often described as "the eighth major". In addition to these firms,
three other types of firms operate in the world oil market: (a) the
"minors", mostly US international companies which are quite large
by almost any other standard, except that of the oil industry, (for
example, Philips, Standard Oil of Indiana, Occidental); (b) the
state-owned companies like Kuwait National Oil Company; some of
them, for example ENI, operate as international firms like "minors";
and (c) oil firms of East European countries.
Oil-importing countries do not constitute a homogeneous group. For
example, the USA is the largest oil-producing country in the world,
but because of its high level of demand for oil, it is a net importer.
Some of the oil-importing countries (like UK, Holland or USA) are to
varying extents closely associated with oil-producing interests
through the operations of the large international oil firms which are
domiciled there.1 Furthermore, one needs to make a distinction
between rich and poor oil-importing countries.
* Biplab Dasgupta is a Fellow of the Institute.
For a detailed account of the advantages which accrue to the mother countries
by way of foreign exchange earnings and access to an important raw material,
see Michael 'Lanzer, The Political Economy of International Oil and the
Underdeveloped Countries, London, 1969.
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This paper is divided into three parts. In section 2, we will examine
the main characteristics of the large international firms; section 3
will briefly cover the current oil crisis in an historical perspective. In
section 4 we will examine the future role of these firms in the
oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.
2. Main Characteristics of Large International Firms in Oil
The four main characteristics of these firms are that they are:
(a) large, (b) multinational, and (c) vertically integrated
organisations operating in an (d) oligopolistic market.
Large
Their vast size and financial resources enable the majors to enter into
costly, high risk, capital intensive ventures, like finding oil in the
North Sea or Alaska. Very few firms outside the oil industry would
have the financial resources to commit such long-term massive
investment or to maintain such an enormous budget on R & D as the
major oil firms do. Their research activities also help to maintain
their technological superiority over non-major rivals. Moreover, very
few countries of the world possess the resources, the skilled
manpower and the intimate knowledge of the industry and the world
market to bargain on equal terms with these mammoth entities.2
Multinational
The "multinational" character of these firms has many interesting
implications. Because these firms are multinational, their activities
often give rise to serious conflicts between their own global
objectives and the national objectives of the host governments. The
history of the oil industry is full of many such conflicts. For the oil
companies, what matters most is the aggregate profit over all their
operations and covering all the countries in which their affiliates and
associates are functioning. On the other hand, the national
governments are interested in increasing their own revenues from oil
exports; or if they are importers and poor, their main concern is to
2 For details about their activities see Edith Penrose, The Large International
Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry, London,
George Allan & Unwin, 1967.
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minimise the cost of oil imports through refinery construction,
package deals with better prices and terms, and some investment in
exploratory activities. Sometimes the national interests of the host
governments coincide with the international objectives of those oil
firms, sometimes they do not. The following are two typical
examples where their interests do not converge:
the amount of crude oil to be extracted from the oilfields of a
particular country by a multinational company, which owns oilfields
in many countries, depends on a large set of factors, such as the
overall crude oil needs of that company, the ownership structure for
that particular oilfield (whether it is wholly owned or jointly owned
with the government or other companies), as well as the cost, quality
and the location of such crude.3 The amount which the oil company
would decide to lift may not agree with what the government of the
country would want. The latter may want more (to earn more
revenue) or less (to conserve its depleting resources) than the
companies would consider appropriate on the basis of their global
activities. Some of the recent examples of such conflict of interests is
related to the practice of oil companies to acquire concession rights
on a prospective oil-bearing area in order to keep off the potential
competitors, but with no immediate intention of exploring and
producing oil from that area, since its requirements are already being
met at a cheaper cost from other sources.4 There are also instances -
as in the case of Iraq in the 1960s - where the consortium of oil
companies may penalise a host country by offtaking a smaller than
usual amount in the event of serious disagreements between them;5
conflict of interests may also exist over refining crude oil. Many
oil importing countries aspire to be self-sufficient in refinery
products in order to minimise costs of imported oil. The conflict
arises because the interests of the oil companies may best be served
Edith Penrose, "Vertical Integration with Joint ContrGl of Raw Material
Production", Journal of Development Studies, April 1965, pp. 25 1-268.
' Biplab Dasgupta, The Oil Industry in India - Some Economic Aspects, Frank
Cass, London, 1971, pp. 223-231.
For details, see Edith Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing
Countries, op. cit.
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by building fewer and bigger refineries (subject to the constraint of
transport cost from the refinery to the consumption points), thereby
reaping economies of scale and being flexible enough to consume
various types of crude and to produce a varying range of output-
mix.6
One implication of this "multinational" character is that conflicts
between the national governments and oil companies become matters
of international diplomacy and involve the foreign offices of their
mother countries.7 A good example of this was the international
political crises following the nationalisation of the Iranian oil
industry by Mosadeq in 1951; when both the British and the US
governments used their diplomatic influence over other countries to
block successfully the exports of Iranian oil, which eventually led to
the violent overthrow of the Mosadeq government in 1954. More
recently, in the 1960s the threat of stoppage of US aid was applied
against Ceylon and Peru when they nationalised the oil companies
owned by US firms.8 In return for this support, the major oil
companies maintain close relationship with the foreign offices of
their mother countries, and help them in their dealings with the
governments of the countries where the companies operate.9
Oil being an important material for both war and peace-time
economy, the governments of the mother countries of the "majors"
are very keen to retain their access to oil reserves through the latter.
There are often conflicts between different mother countries for
influence in the oil producing areas, which then leads to the sort of
compromise which is reflected in the ownership structure of several
oil consortia in the Middle East. Iraq Petroleum Company, whose
ownership is shared by British (British Petroleum 23.75%), Dutch-
British (Royal Dutch/Shell 23.75%), French (CFP 23.75%), and
6 Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 65-68, 113-117.
George Lenezowski, Oil and State in the Middle East, New York, 1960.
8 Penrose, op. cit.
Tanzer, op. cit., for example, the Vice-President of Standard Oil of New Jersey
said in 1966, "Our government has the interest, as well as the means, to promote
US investments abroad in furthering the objectives of our foreign policy". For
this and similar quotations, see Zuhayr Mikdashi, The Community of Oil
Exporting Countries: A Study of Governmental Co-operation, London, 1972.
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American (Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil jointly
23.75%) interests, as well as an independent (Gulbenkian 5%), is a
good example of the diplomatic involvement of several great powers
in the oil industry of the Middle East.
Vertically integrated
A main characteristic of these large, international firms is their
participation in all stages of activities in the oil industry, from
exploration, development and extraction of crude oil to transporting,
refining and marketing. This, combined with the multinational
character of their operations, has several important consequences for
the economies of the countries in which they operate.' °
A major consequence of vertical integration is that a great deal of
commercial and trading transaction which takes place between
countries is no more than intra-company transaction between the
affiliates of the same mother company. Hence, the prices charged
and paid for are not the results of "arm's length deals", but are
internal bookkeeping prices, or transfer prices involving various
branches of the same corporate body. For example, when the
crude-producing affiliate of Exxon in Saudi Arabia sells crude to the
Exxon refinery at Bombay, from the point of view of the latter
(assuming no interference from the government), the amount
purchased is not dependent on the quoted price.
A corollary of the above is that what matters most to a vertically
integrated firm is the overall profit from all its operations, and not
the "profits" shown by its individual constituents. It is possible for
such a firm to manipulate the transfer prices for inter-affiliate
transactions, and thereby to produce bookkeeping profits or losses
for individual affiliates which are consistent with their overall global
objectives. In fact, the tendency for the vertically integrated oil firm
is to show a higher profit in crude production, because the latter
usually receives more tax concessions than other activities, and to
show a smaller profit or even losses from downstream activities like
refining or marketing.1 I
10 J.G. McLean and F.W. Haigh, The Growth of the Integrated Oil Companies,
1954.
Penrose, op. cit. ; see also, "Profit Sharing between Producing Countries and
Oil Companies in the Middle East", Economic Journal, June 1959.
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The profits or losses shown by the affiliates of such a firm for
production, transportation, refining and other activities in various
countries have no particular significance to the firm concerned,
excepting as a means of tax avoidance and maximisation of aggregate
profit over all activities. 12
On the other hand, the way such prices and profits are shown is
highly significant from the point of view of the governments of the
countries in which they operate. The larger the price at which the
crude producing affiliate of Company X in Country A sells crude to
its refining affiliate in Country B, the higher becomes the foreign
exchange cost of oil imports and the lower becomes the
government's tax revenue on profit in refining in Country B.
It was not until the 1960s that the governments of the poor oil
importing countries came to understand the implications of vertical
integration for crude oil prices which they paid. For example, even in
1961 the government of India was not aware that the refineries in
India, their crude suppliers in the Middle East and a whole range of
intermediate dealers who stood between the refinery and the crude
supplier, were all merely parts of one and the same corporate
organisation.13 One of the reasons for having so many intermediate
organisations was to maintain secrecy about oil prices.
Oligopolistic
The oil industry is a classic example of an oligopolistic market with
seven dominant oligopolistic firms and a large number of smaller
firms on the fringe. In the "golden days" of the oil cartel, about
four-fifths of crude production, refining and marketing was
controlled by the "majors". Even in 1960, the percentages were 84,
74 and 70 respectively for these three main activities.14 Even these
figures underestimate their influence on the market, since many of
the non-major companies are associates of "majors" and are
dependent on them for crude supply or for marketing of crude oil or
products.
12 Penrose, op. cit.
13 Government of India, Report of the Oil Price Enquiry Committee, (Darule
Committee), 1961.
14 Penrose, op. cit.
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The four basic ingredients of the oligopolistic behaviour in the oil
industry are as follows:
(a) World Parity Pricing System
This is a simple, easily understood, basing point price formula which
is jointly adopted by the oligopolists. Until 1945, the US Gulf was
the basing point, and the price of oil anywhere in the world was
fixed by adding transport costs from the US Gulf to that
consumption point, irrespective of where the oil actually came from.
This formula was followed, even when no oil was imported from the
USA by a consumption centre, in order to minimise disputes about
prices between the oligopolists and the consequent risks of a price
war. One consequence of this price policy, from the point of view of
many oil consuming countries, was that they did not benefit from
their possible proximity to oil producing areas, since for the purpose
of price fixation it was only their distance from the US Gulf which
mattered. For example, the price of oil produced in Burma was
cheaper in London than in Calcutta (which was 6,000 miles nearer to
Burma) because London was closer to the US Gulf. 15
After 1945, the Persian Gulf was made the second basing point for
the Eastern Hemisphere market. By mutual consent, the "majors"
now declared the same "posted prices" fob Persian Gulf for crudes of
different variety and a wide range of oil products; and these were
taken as bases for price fixation in the consumption centres. Even
during the 1960s, the years of oil surplus when the prices of crude oil
and products declined, the fob Persian Gulf posted prices continued
as the base from which discounts in percentage form were deducted.
At one time, the "majors" used to cite the fact that the oil prices
were the same everywhere as evidence that the oil market was
"perfectly competitive"; while the reality was (and even now is) that
the dominant oligopolists strictly adhered to a commonly-agreed
price formula in order to minimise the risks of price wars among
themselves.
1 5 Dasgupta, op. cit., chapter 4. See also H.J. Frank, Crude Oil Prices in the
Middle East: A Study in Oligopolistic Price Behaviour, 1966.
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Market-Sharing Arrangements
The history of the oil industry contains a number of explicit,
written, market-sharing agreements between the oligopolists.
Sometimes markets were divided up territorially (as in the 1909
agreement), sometimes by percentages (as in the 1928 "as is"
agreement), and at other times by a combination of percentage
shares and absolute amounts in a specific market (as in India during
1905-1928). A series of agreements were drawn up during the 1930s
to regulate the distribution to the rest of the world of Soviet and
Rumanian oil, which were not controlled by the "majors", without
disrupting the "world price structure". Since the 1940s, written
agreements are unknown, because of the fear of US anti-trust
legislation, but the behaviour of the "majors" in this respect is
influenced by the unwritten code of conduct of the oil industry
against encroachment into each other's territory. 16
Price Wars
As distinct from price competition, price war results in reduced
prices only for a short period and, more often than not, is followed
by the restoration of prices to the pre-price war level. Like the price
formula and market-sharing agreements, price wars were an
interesting feature of the oil industry up to the Second World War. A
price war was usually initiated by a company which was dissatisfied with
its market share, and was used as a weapon to force its rivals to
accept a redistribution favourable to the company initiating the price
war. 17
In many 'cases, price wars are also initiated when it is thought that
some of the provisions of a previous agreement have been violated by
a rival (e.g. the price wars of 1909, 1911, and 1928). There was a
tendency for these price wars to spread to many markets, and these
"world price wars" caused serious financial losses to all the
oligopolists. The 1928 "as is" agreement was an attempt to stop
these costly contests, and, since then, excepting for rare instances of
very short-term and highly localised price wars in the petrol trade,
16 Dasgupta, op. cit., chapter 4.
' Dasgupta. op. cit., chapter 4.
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price wars between the oligopolists have become a rare phenomenon.
Not that competition between them has been completely eliminated,
but these usually take the form of non-price competitions, except
when selling crude to independent refineries; but even in this case,
prices are accompanied by varying credit facilities and freight rates
which make them non-comparable. 18
Since 1928, most of the price wars have been fought between
"majors" collectively on one side, and the newcomers to the oil
trade. Before 1959, the competition of "independents" was localised
because of the smallness of their organisations and the virtual
absence of non-major sources of crude oil in the Eastern Hemisphere.
The "majors" took part in these price wars in order to bring the
independents to heel, and succeeded in either eliminating them from
the market, or in forcing them to become appendages to their
corporate entities through long-term supply arrangements. Since
1959, such competition is no longer localised with the entry into the
market of a number of big independents, such as Philips, ENI,
Standard Oil of Indiana, and Occidental. 19
(d) Organisational Interdependence
Apart from explicit or tacit pricing or market-sharing arrangements
between themselves, the oligopolists also jointly own a number of
important enterprises in the oil industry. In the marketing and
refining sectors many familiar names are found like Caltex (jointly
owned by Standard Oil of California and Texas Oil), Burmah-Shell
(jointly owned by Burmah Oil, an associate of British Petroleum, and
Royal Dutch/Shell), Standard-Vacuum (jointly owned by Standard
Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil, although the partnership was
dissolved in the 1960s). But more important are crude producing
organisations, like Aramco of Saudi Arabia (jointly owned by four
US "majors"), Kuwait Oil Company (jointly owned by British
Petroleum and Gulf Oil), Iranian Consortium (where the seven
"majors" together own 79%, CFP 6%, and US independents 5%), and
the crude producing organisations of Iraq, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi
(where four "majors" and CFP together own 95%, and the rest is
1 8 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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owned by a group of American independent companies), where the
major companies are jointly involved. In addition there are several
long-term supply arrangements (e.g. between Royal Dutch/Shell and
Gulf Oil, under which the latter supplies its entire share of Kuwait oil
to the former) and crude and product swapping arrangements in
order to iron out localised surpluses and deficits of the individual
companies without having to arrange long distance transportation.
As the discussion in section 3 will show, the oligopolistic
dominance of the oil market by the "majors" weakened after 1959.
But until then, they were virtually the only suppliers of crude and oil
products in the world outside the USA and the communist countries.
And as long as they maintained a common front against other
competitors and the governments of the oil consuming countries, it
was not easy to argue with them about prices, or to induce them to
build refineries where this was not in conformity with their own
interests, or to plan for a national self-reliant oil industry. Not only
that, they were hostile to newcomers in the oil industry; the
"majors" were in the habit of threatening immediate stoppage of oil
supply if the governments of consuming countries attempted to
follow a policy which would make them less dependent on "majors".
An example of this was the refusal of the "majors" to refine cheaper
crude from the Soviet Union in 1960 in Cuba and India, and another
example was their threat to close down their business in India in the
following year when the government insisted on a reduction in
product prices.
3. The Historical Background to the Current Oil Crisis
The history of the oil industry can be conveniently divided into the
following three phases in terms of the role of the large international
firms:
the period until 1959 when the oligopolistic domination of the
world market by the "majors" was virtually complete;
the 1960s when many new competitors arose in the oil market,
producing an excess of supply over demand for oil; an era of
declining oil prices, which led to the formation of the Organisation
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, (OPEC);
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(iii) the 1970s when the demand-supply conditions were reversed
and prices increased; OPEC became stronger, pushing the major
companies into the background in oil negotiations.
One of the important factors in causing this change was the re-entry
of Soviet oil exports onto the world market in 1958, and on a large
scale in 1959. Before 1917, Russian oil was the chief competitor to
American oil in the world market. After the Revolution, Russian oil
exports virtually disappeared, except for a brief appearance in the
late 1920s and early 1930s (one of which caused the 1928 price war
between the "majors"), until 1959 when a shipment of Soviet crude
oil was sold to a Japanese independent refiner. Very soon, Soviet
exports spread to Italy, Germany, France, India, Greece and other
countries, and everywhere these were sold at a price lower than
world parity price, and often as part of a package deal involving
other products under terms favourable to their partners. °
A second, and no less important, factor was the emergence of a
number of new competitors who succeeded in finding oil in the
neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and afterwards also
in Libya. Since they had no ready marketing outlet, these "minors"
were prepared to sell their crude at a much lower than prevailing
price to the independent refineries of Western Europe and Japan. 21
Unlike the "majors" who possessed their own marketing outlets,
both the Soviet Union (and Rumania, another oil producing country
in the communist bloc), as well as the "minors", were also prepared
to build refineries in partnership with the governments in order to
receive priority over their competitors in supplying crude to these
markets. They were also willing to help the governments with
exploratory activities as contractors or with a minority share in the
crude producing company, terms which were unacceptable to the
"majors".
20 Harold Lubell, The Soviet Oil Offensive and Interbiock Economic
Competition, 1961, (mimeograph).
2 1 Dasgupta, op. cit., chapters 7 and 8.
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Both of these factors made the oil industry more competitive,
particularly from the point of view of the oil consuming countries,
who were now presented with many alternative sources from which
they could buy oil. Inevitably, the world parity prices crumbled; in
some markets, crude was being sold at prices 30-40% below fob
Persian Gulf "posted prices". "Only fools and affiliates pay posted
prices", was the popular joke of the time in the oil industry; but even
the affiliates were finding it increasingly difficult to pay full "posted
prices" because now the governments of the oil consuming countries
were more aware of the changed conditions of the world ou industry.
The "majors" were, as a result, forced to reduce "posted prices" in
order to meet this competition. But this led to serious conflicts with
oil producing countries, who had been eligible since the early 1950s
to a half share in the profits from oil, and the decline in oil prices
meant for them a lower oil revenue per barrel of oil sold. OPEC was
formed in 1960 with the primary objective of halting this decline in
oil prices, and succeeded in its aim to stabilise the "posted prices".
What this meant in effect was that for the purpose of calculating the
tax revenues of the governments of oil producing countries, "posted
prices" (which were pegged at their 1960 level) were used as the
base; but in practice the oil companies were selling oil at prices which
were lower than "posted prices". In other words, while theoretically
the profit from oil was split equally between the companies and the
governments, in practice, because the realised prices were below
posted prices, the host countries received more than half the actual
profit. 22
Two other objectives of OPEC were (a) to induce increases in oil
prices, on the grounds that the fob Persian Gulf price of crude was a
small proportion of the price the ultimate consumers paid for oil;
and that while the prices of industrial goods had been increasing over
time, the oil prices had remained at a very low level for many years;
and (b) to secure a greater degree of participation in the oil industries
of their own countries.23
22 Penrose, op. cit.
23 Based on various papers presented to the World Petroleum Congress during
this period. See M. Adelman, World Petroleum Market, 1972.
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Their ability to achieve (a) depended on their success in controlling
production. Although some attempts were made towards pro rata
allocation of production, it failed during the 1960s. Not all the oil
producers were members of OPEC; the Soviet Union was an
important outsider. Some of the oil producers like Libya had just
begun production, and they were unwilling to accept any
prorationing arrangements based on existing production shares of
various countries. There were also political problems; Iran could be
played against the Arabs, as the "conservative" Arabs (like Saudi
Arabia or Kuwait) could be played against the "progressive" Arabs
(like Iraq, and after the coup, Libya). More success was achieved
with (b), as the state owned oil companies were formed which
entered into many joint exploration agreements with "minors".
Realised prices were low and declining all through the 1960s. New
oilfields in Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Abu Dhabi sustained the
condition of an excess of supply over demand, and some experts -
notably Maurice Adelman of MIT - confidently forecasted a price of
one dollar per barrel of crude by the 1970s. Adelman's argument was
simple; the production cost of oil (at 8 to 20 cents per barrel) was
too iow in relation to the market price of $1.30 to $1.60, and he
expected that further competition would bring down the latter to a
level nearer the "floor price". He recognised that the oil market was
not that competitive, and the growing pressure of the OPEC for
higher prices, but thought that the latter would not succeed in
uniting and controlling production to effect such price increases.24
The changed situation in the 1970s has been described in detail in
the other papers in this number. The question to ask is, how was it
possible for the crude oil prices to increase from about $1.28 for 340
API25 in 1970 to $11.65 per barrel after October 1973? One reason
for this is the current fear that oil reserves will be exhausted in
another 35 to 40 years. This fear may not be well founded - the
"proved" reserves are usually conservative estimates, the "probable"
24 M. Adelman, op. cit.
25 API is an inverse measure of the specific gravity of crude oil the lighter the
oil, the higher the API reading. Lighter crudes enjoy a price differential based on
gravity; for example, during the 1960s it was 2 per degree API.
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reserves are quite high, and there are possibilities of abundant
supplies of non-conventional oil from tar sand, shale and coal. It is
the general experience in the oil industry that periods of optimism
about future supplies are followed by periods of unfounded
pessimism; while the "proved" reserves continuously increase with
further exploratory work. 26 What is certain, however, is that
whereas a number of big new oilfields were discovered during the
1960s, except for the North Sea, the record of the 1970s has so far
not been very impressive, and the production-reserve ratio of most
oilfields has been rising. Furthermore, this reduced rate of discovery
of "proved" crude reserves has been combined with an accelerated
rate of growth in demand, particularly in the US and Japan. The
regulation of crude production by Arab oil producers was now
possible for three other reasons:
the Soviet exports were no longer an economically big threat,
with the increased demand for oil within that country, and
politically they have been close to the Arabs7
the contradiction between new and old producers is not so
significant now, since countries like Libya, Algeria and Abu Dhabi
have reached their peak production levels;
politically the Arabs were never so united as now, particularly
after the October 1973 war. What needs to be stressed, however, is
that prices began rising in 1970, long before the 1973 war, although
the war has no doubt strengthened the political will of the Arabs.
Whereas the OPEC's demand for higher prices failed in the 1960s
because of its inability to control production, after the 1973 war it
has been possible both to increase the price and to regulate
production.
Perhaps more remarkable than these price increases is the increasing
participation by the governments in running the oil industry. In
1971, Algeria nationalised the oil industry, and Libya nationalised
BY. By 1973, the Libyan government had 51% ownership in other
26 Petroleum Press Service, July 1973, October 1973.
27 Petroleum Economist, June 1974.
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concessions, Nigeria took over 35% of Shell-BP concessions, and
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Iraq and Kuwait took over 25% of
equity in oil consortia, and made agreements with the oil companies
that by 1982 their share would be 51%. In January 1974, the Kuwait
government acquired 60% of ownership in the Kuwait Oil Company,
followed by similar negotiating objectives in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
But the most significant was the nationalisation of the Iranian oil
industry in 1973 by the same Shah who overthrew Mosadeq and
denationalised the Iranian oil industry in 1954.
The situation as it stands in mid-1974 contrasts sharply with that
prevailing in the oil industry two decades ago. Crude oil prices are no
longer fixed by the "majors", this role having been taken over by the
oil producing states. The companies no longer control oil production
in the Middle East, and majority ownership has passed into the hands
of the governments. Moreover, even in the sphere of marketing -
where their dominance was decisive in the clash with Mosadeq -
many oil consuming countries of West Europe and the less-developed
world have been busily working out bilateral deals on oil directly
with the governments of oil producing countries, by-passing the
companies. Whereas their mother country governments were so
vigorous in the past in defending company interests in the host
countries, and often turned a blind eye on their evasion of tax and
anti-trust laws, now these governments are often more concerned
with maintaining good relations with, and flow of oil from, the oil
producing countries.8
What the oil companies are losing in terms of control over the
industry is being partly compensated by the lucrative profits they
have made because of higher oil prices; most "majors" have increased
their profit by 60% to 100% over the past year.29 Their control over
a substantial part of the marketing network and refining capacity
would continue to produce good profit figures for them for a long
time to come. The nationalisation of their interests has not
necessarily jeopardised their access to crude oil; Iran, for example,
28 Petroleum Economist, July 1974, "Companies Under Fire".
29 However, a great deal of this profit has come from the sale of stocks
accumulated before October 1973.
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has agreed to supply crude to the erstwhile members of oil consortia
over 20 years. Moreover, where the companies' interests have not
been fully nationalised they are continuing to manage the industry; it
will take several years before the Kuwaitis, Libyans and Saudis are
able to run their own industries independently of the oil companies.
According to one theory, it was Aramco, the US-owned oil
consortium of Saudi Arabia, which encouraged its host government
in 1973 to press for higher prices; their motive being to gather as
much profit as possible from their operation before the eventual
nationalisation of the industry.30 Some even allege the complicity of
the US government with the Sheikdoms in their decision to increase
prices, with the objective of making research on non-conventional oil
and non-oil substitutes economically viable. 31 There is no way of
testing these theories, but two things are clear:
(j) no-one has ever suggested that the oil companies voluntarily
handed over the control of the industry to the oil producing
countries; and
(ii) the demand-supply conditions in the 1970s, coupled with the
growing stature and effectiveness of OPEC, were the primary causes
for oil price increases, although it is not impossible that, once they
felt that their days in the Middle East were numbered, the "majors"
encouraged OPEC governments to go for further increases.
4. The Future of the Large International Firms
What is the future role of the large international firms in the oil
producing and oil consuming countries? From the point of view of
the existing oil producing countries in the Middle East the
"risk-bearing" function of these companies is no longer of much
relevance. The element of "risk" involved in many exploratory
activities is not that high, and in some of these countries, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait or Abu Dhabi, the production-reserve ratio is too low
to encourage a massive programme for exploration. Moreover, at this
moment, there is no shortage of internal funds for such activities if
these countries decide to go for intensive wildcat drilling. However,
3° New York Post, 10 January 1974.
31 Counter Information Services Anti-Report, The Oilfix, Bertrand Russell
Press, 1974.
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the oil producing countries are still dependent on the foreign
interests in three fields: (a) technology, (b) administration, and (c)
marketing. For a long time the major oil companies ignored the local
demand for the training of indigenous personnel; the presence of a
handful of local personnel in high technical or administrative
positions was hardly more than symbolic. It was only during the
1960s that through the state-owned companies and with the help of
international "minors" some progress was made towards the training
of local personnel. Even now, although the local personnel are
capable of performing the day-to-day routine activities, they lack the
confidence and skill to handle breakdowns. The oil producing
countries differ between themselves in their ability to run the
industry - from Iran, which has a surplus of technical personnel, to
Abu Dhabi, which is almost totally dependent on the foreign
personnel for high-skilled jobs. With further training of local
personnel and a greater freedom of movement of skilled personnel
between the oil-producing countries (which is inhibited by political
factors, such as the mutual suspicion between Iran and her Arab
neighbours), this technological constraint would, one hopes, be
removed in future. But even in the short run the technological
dependence on the "majors" is not unavoidable. Unlike the situation
15 years ago, today there are many suppliers of technology in the
world market, including the "minors", the East Europeans, the
Japanese and the companies like ENI, and equity ownership is no
longer a price which must be paid to foreign interests for buying
technology.
Perhaps more serious than the technological constraint from a
long-term point of view is the marketing constraint. Until very
recently an overwhelming proportion of the total crude and refinery
production passed through the hands of the "majors", who acted as
intermediaries between the oil exporting and the oil importing
countries. Because they owned many different types of crude,
operated refineries with a wide range of product-mix, conducted
their business in hundreds of markets with widely varying demand
patterns for oil products, owned tanker fleets to carry oil from a
large number of producing areas, it was possible for them to balance
the demand and supply for different types of crude and products at
the world level, if not singly at least collectively through long-term
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supply arrangements and temporary swapping arrangements. In
contrast, the governments of the oil producing countries in the world
do not own elaborate marketing networks, and because they rely on
a limited range of crudes and products, it is not possible for them to
satisfy all types of consumers or to meet short-term shortages on
surpluses in individual markets. At this moment - with the cloud of
oil shortage hanging over the industry - the marketing problem is
not so serious; in fact, the buyers themselves are eager to sign up
long-term agreements or to bid enthusiastically for crudes of all
varieties which are offered for sale. But this condition may not last
indefinitely; with further discoveries of oil and the possibilities of
technological breakthroughs in producing non-conventional oil and
oil substitutes, in future it would be necessary for the oil producing
countries to build their own tanker fleet and to strengthen their own
marketing arrangements. It is also necessary for various reasons for
such marketing activities to be co-ordinated through an agency like
OPEC; firstly, because the marketing sector is the stronghold of the
large international "majors" and no member country of OPEC would
be able to match their strength singlehandedily; secondly, because
such co-ordination would make crude supply more flexible from the
viewpoint of consumers; and thirdly, because without this
co-ordination there is the risk of the member countries following
widely divergent pricing policies which are in line with their own
individual development programmes.
Coming now to the poor oil importing countries, their future
relationship with the major international oil companies can be
considered under three separate headings - crude production,
refining and marketing.
Contrary to the popular view, the large international companies are
usually "risk averters"; which is why an overwhelming proportion of
their drilling effort is concentrated on areas with proved oil prospects
(like the Middle East) or in or near western large oil consuming
countries, which are politically stable from their viewpoint. Poor oil
consuming countries with uncertain prospects for oil do not figure
highly in their list of priorities. Even when they acquire concessions
in those countries and dig a few holes (as Stanvac did in India -
taking more than ten years to drill ten wells), the primary motive is
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to keep the potential rivals away rather than to find oil. With the
changed conditions in the oil industry over the past year it is not
unlikely that this attitude of international oil companies towards
exploratory work in oil consuming poor countries would somewhat
change, in order to reduce their dependence on Middle East crude.
But the "political risk" (e.g. nationalisation or the country
concerned joining OPEC) of such investment would always be high
from the point of view of international companies. This explains the
emphasis they place on exploration in Alaska or the North Sea,
where the "political risk" is low. 32
The reluctance of the major companies to invest in exploration in
poor oil consuming countries, many of whom are now desperate to
find at least some oil within their boundaries, may not be a bad thing
from the countries' point of view. Unlike the situation 15 years ago,
it is now possible to receive technological help from foreign
collaborators without conferring equity ownership on them, and
there is little justification for thinking that the latter would be any
less successful than the "majors" in discovering oil. The history of
the oil industry is full of stories of oil explorers with limited means
or experience or both; for example, William Knox d'Arcy, who
discovered oil in Iran, was a businessman of modest means, while
Occidental, which have been so successful in finding oil in Libya had
no previous experience in this industry, and the Japanese oil
companies are continuing to find oil without much of either. In a
large number of cases, after a small explorer has found oil, he has
been bought up by a major company. Leaving aside very highly
expensive explorations with most advanced technology, like the
North Sea drilling, the success rates of large international firms are
not appreciably better than those for the other firms.
The emergence of OPEC countries as a powerful force in the oil
industry has opened up new opportunities for the poor oil
consuming countries, particularly the possibilities of joint
exploratory activities both in OPEC and poor oil consuming
countries with the technical help of "minors" or East European
countries. From the point of view of the OPEC countries this would
32 Dasgupta, op. cit., chapter 9.
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be a fruitful investment of their surplus funds in an industry with
which they are familiar. It would also be politically effective, both in
creating goodwill in poor oil consuming countries and in diversifying
the investment of their oil revenue. Moreover, if oil is found, it
would not be competitive with their own production if produced
under their part-ownership. From the point of view of the poor oil
consuming countries, whether crude is found in oil producing
countries or within their own territories, this would reduce the
impact of the new oil prices on their balance of payments.
In the field of refining four of the strongest arguments usually
advanced in favour of the participation of international oil
companies (both "majors" and "minors") in equity ownership are as
follows:
the latter are able to arrange crude supply on a long-term basis;
they are better able, because of their wide marketing network,
to handle "refinery imbalance", that is, surplus in some oil products
(say petrol) and deficits in some others (for example, diesel), which
arises because of the divergence between the pattern of demand for
different oil products and the output pattern of the refineries;
they are technically and managerially efficient; and
they can provide the necessary capital and foreign exchange for
building the refineries from their own resources.
Of these, (a) is now better secured through direct bilateral
arrangements with oil producing countries, arid, as far as (c) is
concerned, indigenous personnel in many poor countries - including
India - are now able to run their own refinery, once it is installed. If
the refineries are built in collaboration with the oil producing
countries, with the arrangement that the latter would provide crude
oil and the foreign exchange cost of the project - which is consistent
with the OPEC's long-term interest in participating in downstream
activities - it would be possible to remove constraint (d) without
bringing in the internationals. The constraint (b) is the most difficult
to remove in the near future since neither the oil consuming
countries nor the OPEC countries yet possess the wide contacts with
many countries with varying consumption and output patterns.
As the above discussion shows, many of the roles which the "majors"
65
LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRMS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY
performed in both the oil producing and the oil consuming countries
can now be performed jointly by these two sets of countries
independently of the large international firms. For a long time the
major multinationals stood between the oil exporting and the oil
importing countries and intermediaries. They fixed the prices of
crude oil and refined products and arranged their distribution over
the whole world. They knew everything there was to know about the
oil industry and about the specific requirements and peculiarities of
the individual markets, while very few organisations, governments or
individuals outside their oligopolistic network were knowledgeable
enough to challenge the data they furnished. They decided how
much of crude oil to produce from Country A, and how much to sell
to Country B, and the governments of these countries, particularly
when they were poor and ignorant about the intricacies of the oil
business had very little influence over these decisions. There was no
possibility of any direct relationship between Countries A and B,
by-passing the "majors". This situation has changed over the past 15
years, particularly since October 1973. The major oil companies no
longer fix oil prices, and the oil producing countries are now
increasingly taking over the role of sellers of their own crude oil
through direct negotiations with oil consuming countries. Moreover,
they are increasingly participating in the refining and other
downstream activities in oil consuming countries. There is no reason
why in future, collaborations in the field of the oil industry could not
je extended to oil-based industries (like fertiliser) and other activities
which are mutually beneficial to both of these two sets of countries.
How are the large international oil firms responding to this changed
situation of loss of power to determine prices and of reduced
importance as intermediaries and suppliers of crude oil? It is true
that the present high prices of oil are not hurting them financially;
but more important than that, from a long-term viewpoint, is their
loss of control over the industry and the ever decreasing share of
ownership of crude oil. A reading of the current literature on oil
would point to two alternatives which the "majors" are likely to
follow in the future: one, is to find oil in politically safe areas, like
the North Sea or Alaska, and the other is to gradually move out of
oil and to extend their interests to non-oil and non-conventional oil
industries. It is significant that the US "majors" already own 30% of
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coal reserves and 50% of uranium reserves in the USA. If their
research efforts succeed in making a technological breakthrough in
producing oil from shales, tar sand or coal at low cost, the balance of
power in the energy sector would shift from the Middle East towards
North America. The current high oil prices - whether provoked by
them or not - is helping them in this respect, both by generating
high profit which can be invested in costly exploration programmes
and by making research in non-oil energy and in non-conventional oil
industries financially worthwhile.
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